Nothing is hidden. Every retaliation, every mobilization, every silence in the simulation comes from the decision tree below — probabilities estimated from publicly available doctrines, treaties, and strategic literature. Randomness only enters at dice-roll time: the rules themselves are deterministic.
Source: the simulator’s escalation engine (escalation.js / constants.js). These diagrams are a faithful projection of the code that actually runs.
This engine models political and military escalation, not real-world prediction. Human leadership, diplomacy, accidents, intelligence failures, and domestic politics enter only as probabilistic rules.
The engine processes retaliation round by round — internally, a breadth-first search over the alliance graph: each round’s strikes generate the next round’s retaliations, up to 10 rounds or until nobody fires anymore.
The heart of the simulator. When a country is struck, each of its allies walks this tree. The “phase” sets how fast and how willingly they act: a NATO member reacts in minutes, an SCO member on the other side of the world reacts in days — and usually only condemns.
The struck country itself needs no alliance to strike back. A nuclear strike on a nuclear power triggers near-certain retaliation — a baseline of 85% that only a prior cyber attack on command-and-control (C3I) can pull lower. That is mutually assured destruction.
Automatic retaliation system (inspired by the Soviet “Perimetr”): if a nuclear power equipped with a Dead Hand is struck before it has fired, retaliation launches on its own — even if command has been decapitated. In the simulation, only Russia has one (Perimetr — the only automated dead-hand system widely documented in public).
Base probability that an ally retaliates for a struck partner, depending on the treaty binding them. An “ironclad” guarantee (USA → Japan/South Korea) is unconditional; the SCO is only a dialogue forum, not a military alliance. The figures are the engine’s calibrated design parameters, not measured frequencies.
| Alliance | Nuclear retaliation | Conventional retaliation |
|---|---|---|
| “Ironclad” guarantee (USA→Japan, South Korea…) | 100 % | 90 % |
| NATO / OTAN (art. 5) | 70 % | 55 % |
| CSTO / OTSC | 50 % | 30 % |
| Bilateral treaty | 40 % | 30 % |
| GCC / CCG | 35 % | 20 % |
| Axis of Resistance | 15 % | 80 % |
| SCO / OCS | 10 % | 10 % |
| EU mutual defense (art. 42.7) | 0 % | 30 % |
| AUKUS | 0 % | 0 % |
Modifiers: each ally already committed raises the pressure (+12% per ally, bandwagon effect, capped at 95%); a P5 power (USA, Russia, China, France, UK — the five permanent UN Security Council members) whose direct ally is nuked rises to at least 90%; a prior C3I cyber attack removes 25 points; an ongoing conventional war multiplies by 1.3.
When the cascade ends, the outcome is determined by who fired, at whom, and with what total tonnage (in megatons). The thresholds are simplified abstractions inspired by nuclear-winter research (Robock et al., 2007).
| Outcome | Condition (first line reached) |
|---|---|
| EXTINCTION | ≥ 3 P5 powers fired nuclear, OR ≥ 4 nuclear powers fired, OR ≥ 50 Mt — total nuclear winter. |
| WORLD WAR | ≥ 2 great powers (P5) struck each other, OR ≥ 25 Mt. |
| LIMITED EXCHANGE | At least one nuclear weapon detonated — the long-standing nuclear taboo has been broken, and there is no clean “armistice” anymore. |
| ARMISTICE | No nuclear weapon used. Deterrence held. |